I. Introduction
The main purpose of our study is to examine the implications of public investment in human capital on growth and the evolution of income inequality in an economy in which individuals have different income/skill levels. We concentrate on the formal schooling component of human capital investment as the engine of growth. We construct a model in which some decisions (such as time allocated to schooling) are made privately but others are made through majority Douglas. We assume the initial income distribution to be lognormal. We have chosen this restrictive specification to highlight the influence of income distribution on economic growth and vice versa. Further, it also helps us highlight the distinction between economies in which the quality of education is determined through collective decisions and those in which the quality of education is chosen privately.
In Section IV, we compare the public and private education regimes when the population is homogeneous. In both regimes, a necessary condition for persistent growth is that the learning technology must exhibit nondecreasing returns to the quality of schools and the parental stock of human capital. Further, we find that per capita income under private education is higher than per capita income under public education, in each period.
In Section V, we examine the public and private education regimes for the heterogeneous population. Our results can be briefly summarized as follows: (i) Income inequality declines faster under public education than under private education. (ii) If two public education economies begin with the same per capita income but differ in income inequality, then the economy with lower inequality has higher per capita income in all future periods; this result holds for two private education economies under some additional restrictions. (iii) If the income inequality is sufficiently high, then the public education regime may yield higher per capita income for some future periods.
In Section VI, we let the old agents vote each period on whether the educational system should be private or public. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions under which a majority of old agents would prefer the public education system. Section VII contains the concluding remarks.
II. The Basic Framework
Consider an overlapping generations economy in which individuals live for two periods and die at the end of the second period. In the second period of life, each individual gives birth to another so that the population remains constant over time. Each generation consists of a continuum of agents. Agents within a generation are differentiated by the stock of human capital of their parents. At time t = 0, there is an initial generation of old agents in which the jth member is endowed with knowledge hjo. Knowledge of the members of the initial generation is distributed according to the (probability) distribution function Go(-). We restrict our attention to initial income distributions that are lognormal with parameters PLo and cr. In what follows, we suppress the index j to make the notation less cumbersome. 
where ht is the stock of human capital of the corresponding parent. We assume that 3, y, 8 E (0, 1) so that all factors exhibit diminishing returns. At time t + 1, an individual's income is the same as his human capital ht+ IOur assumption that the quality of schools is an argument in the learning technology is consistent with Card and Krueger (1992), who provide estimates of the effects of school quality measured by student/ teacher ratio, the average term length, and the relative pay of teachers on the rate of return to education for men born in the United States between 1920 and 1949. They find that men educated in states with high average school quality have a higher return to additional years of schooling.3 On the theoretical side, our assumption is similar to the learning technology in Lucas (1988) . A discrete-time version of his technology may be written as ht, -ht = 8(1 -nt)ht, where 8 can be interpreted as the quality of education.
The use of parental knowledge as an input in the learning function is consistent with a number of studies. Coleman et al. (1966) , for instance, found a positive correlation between parental education and performance on standardized tests.
Under the public education regime, each individual's earnings at 2 There are at least three formulations of intergenerational altruism in the distribution and growth literature. First, members of the current generation could value the utility level achieved by their descendants (e.g., Loury 1981). Second, they could value the allocations of their descendants (e.g., Kohlberg 1976 ). Third, members of the current generation may value the wealth they pass on to their descendants (e.g., Banerjee and Newman 1989). In the first two formulations, members of each generation take as given the optimal decision rules of their offspring. In the third formulation, individuals simply allocate their wealth optimally between their own consumption and the bequests to the offspring. The equilibrium concept is significantly simpler in the third approach.
3 See Hanushek (1986) for a review of the evidence on the impact of various measures of quality of education (inputs) on test scores and graduation rates (educational outputs). time t + 1 are taxed at the rate Tt+II Total tax revenues determine the quality of public schools at time t + 1 according to
where Eht+1 $ ht+dGt+l(ht+l). We use E to denote the quality of schools in the public education regime to emphasize the fact that all individuals face the same quality and that it is outside the control of one agent. However, the quality is endogenously determined in each period through majority voting. Thus the only difference between agents born at time t is the skill of their parents, which is an input to their learning technology.
The private education regime differs from the public education regime only in the determination of the quality of education et+ 1. Each individual in the private education regime allocates his income ht+1 between own consumption, ct+ , and the quality of education, et+ 1, for the offspring, that is, ct+ 1 + et+ 1 = ht+ II Note that all variables including the quality of education are individual-specific in the private education regime.
III. Equilibrium
In the public education regime, we solve individual j's optimization problem in two steps. First, we solve for optimal effort, consumption, and human capital investment; that is, individual j's problem is to choose nt and ct+ 1 to maximize ln nt + ln ct+I + lnEt+I subject to where Ht+1 is the mean income at time t + 1. In the optimization problem above, we have implicitly assumed that the young agent at time t cannot commit himself to a tax rate at time t + 1. Note that the old agent's choice of tax rate does not alter his income but affects the fraction of income he can consume.
Equilibrium under Public Education
The equilibrium for the public education economy is a set of sequences {nt}lo, {ht+,}t=o' {c1}1' o, {GI+tQ)}tlo0 {EG}t o and {t}t=O such that (i) nt and ct+ 1 are the optimal choices of an agent born at time t whose parent's human capital is ht; (ii) the human capital of each agent is determined by ht+I = 0(1 -nt)~E-h'; (iii) given the distribution Gt(Q) at time t, the distribution of income Gt+ I(-) at time t + 1 is determined by the transformation of variables ht+ 1 = 0(1 -nt)~E-hV; (iv) the tax rate Tt iS preferred by a majority of old agents at time t; and (v) the quality of schools at time t is Et = Tt f htdGt(ht).
It is easy to see that the time allocated to human capital investment by an individual born at time t is 1-nt 1+t.
It is independent of the tax rate and the individual type because of the log preferences and Cobb-Douglas learning technology. The individual's stock of human capital at time t + 1 is independent of the tax rateTt+ 1 but depends on his parent's stock of knowledge and is given by t+1 = 0Et(1 2 t) h?
Equation ( 
Equilibrium under Private Education
The equilibrium for the private education economy is a set of sequences {nt}ot=, {et}'t=, {ct}'t=, {ht t}t=o, and {Gt+ (-)}I' % such that (i) nt, ct+ 19 and et+ 1 are the optimal choices of an agent born at time t whose parent's human capital is ht; (ii) the human capital of each agent is determined by ht+I = 0(1 -nt)Pe'h8; and (iii) given the distribution Gt(-) at time t, the distribution of income Gt+ 1() at time t + 1 is determined by the transformation of variables ht+I = 0(1 -nt)Peyh?.
Clearly, an agent born at time t will choose future consumption and quality of education to be ct+1 = et+, = 1/2ht+ . The quality is agent-specific: an agent with high income will bequeath high quality. The time allocated to human capital investment is then determined by the first-order condition 1/nt = 2p/(1 -nt), which implies I1-n (8)
Note that the time devoted to human capital accumulation is different in the two economies. In the private education regime, each agent accounts for the fact that an additional unit of time spent toward learning increases not only his earnings but also the bequests passed on to his offspring. In the public education regime, the latter benefit is not taken into account; each agent views his contribution to the quality of public education as negligible. 
IV. Homogeneous Agents
In this section we compare the equilibrium paths of per capita income for the two education regimes when the initial generation is homogeneous; that is, the initial distribution of income is degenerate so that the per capita income at time t coincides with the representative agent's income. The purpose here is to abstract from distributional issues and compare the levels and growth rates of income in the two education regimes. To distinguish incomes in the two regimes we shall use superscript u for the public regime and superscript r for the private regime. From (7) and (9), the evolution of income in the two regimes may be written as equation in the Cass-Koopmans framework. Thus, as figure 1 illustrates, when -y + 8 < 1, the steady state is globally stable in both economies and independent of the initial stock of human capital. Further, when -y + 8 > 1, the steady state is unstable in both economies; when -y + 8 = 1, a steady state typically will not exist.
In the next three propositions we compare the public and private education economies. To make the comparisons legitimate, we shall assume that both private and public education economies start off with the same (positive) level of initial income ho. In proposition 2, we establish that the private education economy has a higher income level than the public education economy in every time period. In proposition 3, we show that every generation is better off in the private education economy. In proposition 4, we compare the long-run growth rates. The main reason why the evolution of income in the public education economy is different from that in the private education economy is that the time devoted to human capital accumulation is different in the two economies. Proposition 2 states that along the equilibrium path a private education economy yields higher income levels in all periods than a public education economy. As noted in Section III, the time devoted to human capital accumulation in a private education economy is higher than that in the public education economy, and hence incomes are higher. By continuity, it seems reasonable to expect that the result would hold if the population was "slightly" heterogeneous. However, if the population was sufficiently heterogeneous, then the public education economy may yield higher mean incomes for some future periods than a private education economy. We provide an example in the next section to demonstrate this result. Proposition 3 states that the representative agent in the private education economy is better off than his counterpart in the public education economy. It is clear that the equilibrium allocations in the public education economy are feasible for the representative agent in the private education economy. By optimizing he can do better and attain a higher level of utility.
The key parameter that determines growth in our model is the sum -y + 8. In both regimes, quality of education and human capital are the two channels through which accumulation takes place. Since our learning technology is Cobb-Douglas, income at time t + 1 depends critically on the sum of the exponents on quality and human capital at time t, that is, on -y + 5.
The basic content of proposition 4 is that increasing returns are neither necessary nor sufficient for long-run growth in either economy. For the case -y + 8 < 1, the long-run growth rate is zero. This result is analogous to the zero net investment result in the Two remarks are in order here. First, given the same initial conditions, propositions 2 and 4 suggest that the private education economy with homogeneous population achieves higher incomes and growth rates than the public education economy whenever -y + 8 -1. Second, if a policy of mandatory schooling is enforced, then the allocations in the public education regime would be the same as in the private education regime. That is, if we set the time allocated to human capital investment equal to f/(1/2 + P) in the public education regime, then the law of motion of human capital is identical in both regimes. Hence, the allocations in the two regimes must be the same.
V. Heterogeneous Agents
In this section we examine the heterogeneous agents case. As stated in Section II, the initial income distribution is assumed to be lognormal with parameters [L and 42. The assumption helps us characterize the evolution of income inequality over time. It also makes the comparison between private and public education economies very convenient. In our model, income inequality at time t is naturally described by the parameter cr.6 In proposition 5 below, we characterize the evolution of income inequality in both public and private education economies. Part a of proposition 5 follows directly from equation (7). Since 8 < 1, ht+ A/ht is a decreasing function of ht; that is, households with low incomes experience higher growth rates than households with high incomes so that income inequality declines over time. Thus income distribution in the long run is degenerate. The intuition for part b is similar since equation (9) has the same implications as (7). But note that even if -y + 8 < 1, income inequality in the private education economy does not decline as fast as in the public education economy.
The income convergence result in our public education economy is similar to that in Tamura (1991). In his model, the learning technology exhibits spillovers: each agent's stock of human capital tomorrow is not only a function of his private stock today but also a function of the average human capital stock of society today. In ours, all agents in the public education regime face the same quality that is a function of average income. In both models the growth rate of any agent's income is inversely related to the level of his income. Thus agents with income below the average grow faster than agents with income above the average. This is also the reason why we get income convergence in the private education economy when -y + 8 < 1.
The income convergence result also implies that the conditions for long-run growth in per capita income in the public education regime with heterogeneous agents are identical to those in the homogeneous agent economy (see proposition 4). It turns out that proposition 4 also holds for the private education economy with heterogeneous agents. This follows from equation (9). If -y + 8 < 1, then income distribution in the long run is degenerate so that the conditions for growth in per capita income are the same as those in the homoge-neous economy. If -y + 8 = 1, then all agents in the private education economy grow at the same constant rate, and hence the conditions hold for the "average" agent. If -y + 8 > 1, then, depending on initial conditions, the per capita income grows at an increasing rate without bounds.7 Finally, note that along the balanced growth path (-y + 8 = 1) income inequality declines in the public education economy but stays the same in the private education economy.
The next proposition relates current income inequality to future levels of per capita income. Proof. See the Appendix. Proposition 6 states that if two public education economies start off with the same per capita income but different income distributions, then the economy with a lower income inequality will have a higher per capita income in the future. One way to see this is to think of the incomes in the two economies, ht and h', as random variables so that h' is a mean-preserving spread of ht. The transformation of the random variable between periods t and t + 1 in each economy is ht+l = A(Ht)'hV. This transformation is concave since 8 < 1. Part a then is a direct application of theorem 2 in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) . Similar reasoning can be used to establish part b. Although proposition 6 establishes an order relation between per capita income levels only for the next period, it should be clear that the relation holds for all future periods.
As noted at the end of Section IV, the private education economy yields higher growth and per capita incomes when the initial income inequality is low. We show through an example below that if the initial income inequality is sufficiently high, then the public education economy may yield higher per capita income for some future periods than the private education economy. Consider two economies with the same income distribution at time t and technology parameters satisfying y + 28 < 1 so that (-y + 8)2 < y + 82* Note that In the previous sections we exogenously imposed the educational system: either all agents attend public schools or all agents attend private schools. In this section we try to endogenize the choice of educational system. There are several ways to endogenize this choice: (i) parents pay taxes only if they send their children to public schools, (ii) all parents pay taxes but are free to send their children to private schools, and (iii) parents decide by majority vote whether the educational system should be private or public and no one can opt out.
In the first case, it is easy to see that no one would desire the public school system. The individual with the highest income can do better on his own and hence will not use the public schools. Once the richest individual opts out of the public education system, the second-richest individual has exactly the same incentives to opt out and the whole system unravels. For the second case, Stiglitz (1974) has shown that preferences over tax rates are not single-peaked. Hence, standard arguments do not guarantee the existence of a voting equilibrium.
We examine the third case in this section. In each period, the old generation decides by majority vote whether the educational system should be private or public. In the latter case it also decides the tax rate. The following proposition establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for a majority of old agents to choose the public education system at any time t. PROPOSITION 7. A majority of old agents at time t would prefer public over private education if and only if cr > 0.
Proof. Under public education, it is clear that the tax rate preferred by the majority of old agents is '/2 and the indirect utility of an old agent with income ht is Q.E.D. The skewness of the income distribution is crucial to this result. In the public education regime, every parent's bequest depends on average income; in the private education regime, it depends on the parent's income. Since the median income is below the mean, majority voting results in public education.
VII. Conclusions
We have presented a model of endogenous economic growth with heterogeneous agents. We concentrate on the formal schooling aspect of human capital investment as the engine of growth in a model with simple functional forms for preferences, technologies, and income distribution. These functional forms help us obtain joint predictions on the growth of per capita income and the evolution of income distribution. We contrast two regimes of education: public schools, in which investment in the quality of schools is made through majority voting, and private schools, in which each household chooses its quality of education. We find that public education reduces income inequality more quickly than private education. On the other hand, private education yields higher per capita incomes unless the initial income inequality is sufficiently large. Finally, we endogenize the choice of education regime: if a majority of agents have income below average, then the vote is in favor of public education.
